NOTES
THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
By filing a petition for habeas corpus, an individual in the custody of
state officials may obtain federal judicial review of his claim that such
custody violates his constitutional rights. However, before any federal
district court may hear a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner must have
exhausted all available state remedies.' In applying this requirement to a
state prisoner alleging a denial of his right to a speedy trial, 2 most federal
courts initially held that the petitioner could obtain federal review of his
claim, notwithstanding the fact that he had not yet been brought to trial and
convicted by a state court. 3 Most recently, however, federal courts addressing this question have held that a petitioner requesting discharge must
present his speedy trial claim as a defense to the charges brought at his state
trial before he can be deemed to have exhausted his state remedies. 4
After briefly tracing the initial applications of the exhaustion requirement to habeas corpus petitioners alleging denial of their right to a speedy
trial, this Note will analyze the very abrupt shift in the position taken by the
federal courts on this question, emphasizing their reliance on recent Su1. The exhaustion requirement was first articulated in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886), and was clearly expressed in terms of federal-state comity and not as a mandatory
jurisdictional requirement. The justification given for the exhaustion requirement was that it
would preserve the role of state courts in the application of federal law and would also
encourage orderly administration of state judicial business, preventing interruption of state
adjudication by federal habeas corpus proceedings. The early decisions, although recognizing
the significance of the interests of federalism served, stressed that the exhaustion requirement
was not a binding rule but merely a procedure which normally should be followed. See Tinsley
v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
In subsequent decisions, however, as the exhaustion requirement was repeatedly applied,
it came to be viewed as matter of compulsion and not one of discretion. See Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per
curiam). This restrictive application of the requirement ended, however, in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), where the Court declared that the exhaustion rule was a matter of comity, not
of jurisdiction. The requirement is thought today to be an aspect of the proper exercise of
power by the federal courts and not an element of the definition of the power itself. Id. at 42526, 434-35 (1963).
The exhaustion requirement has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), the habeas
corpus statute governing collateral attack on convictions in state courts, and has been held to
apply also as a judicial doctrine in all other habeas corpus actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1970). See Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial ...
" U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
3. See notes 10-14 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text.
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preme Court dicta5 and more general considerations of federal-state comity.
It will conclude that the recent case of Brown v. Estelle6 represents an
appropriate resolution of the issues.
INITIAL APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
TO SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIMS

A state prisoner could not base a habeas corpus petition on an allegation that he had been denied a speedy trial until 1966, when the Supreme

Court held that the right to a speedy trial was guaranteed to state defendants
through the fourteenth amendment. 7 Although few habeas petitions claiming denial of a speedy trial were initially filed by state defendants, the

number of such petitions increased greatly after Smith v. Hooey8 established
the obligation of a state with charges pending against a prisoner incarcerated
in another state to make a full good faith effort to bring the defendant to
trial. 9

The first court of appeals to apply the exhaustion requirement to a
pretrial habeas corpus petition claiming denial of a speedy trial was the
Fourth Circuit in Kane v. Virginia.10 The court admitted that federal habeas
relief was not ordinarily available to a state prisoner before trial, but
5. The dicta which are referred to appear in Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky,
410 U.S. 484 (1973). See notes 18-25 infra and accompanying text.
6. 530 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. The Court held in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), that the guarantees of
the sixth amendment were included in the concept of due process required by the fourteenth
amendment and as such could be extended to the states. See generally Recent Decisions, Sixth
Amendment Right to Speedy Trial Applied to the States by Incorporation into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 316 (1968); Note, Effect of the
Right to Speedy Trial on Nolle Prosequi, 46 N.C.L. REV. 387 (1968).
8. 393 U.S. 374 (1969). This decision concerned the plight of a prisoner incarcerated in one
state with charges filed against him by another state. Before Hooey, it had been contended by
the states that the state with pending charges was totally absolved from any duty under the
constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial. See generally Note, Extending the Smith v. Hooey
Duty to the Holding Jurisdiction, 23 MAINE L. REV. 201 (1971); Note, The State Must Make a
Diligent Good Faith Effort to Obtain the Presence of an Accused for Trial When He is
Incarcerated by Another Jurisdiction and Requests a Speedy Trial, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1210
(1969).
9. 393 U.S. at 382-83. Although this case was not itself an appeal of a habeas corpus
petition, the decision would greatly increase the number of speedy trial claims brought by this
method. After the obligation to bring out-of-state prisoners to trial had been established, a
whole new class of claimants, those prisoners against whom detainer warrants have been issued,
filed habeas petitions. See Note, Habeas Corpus-An Erosion of Law and Order?, 14 CATHOLiC LAWYER 293 (1968). See also Meyer, Effective Utilization of Criminal Detainer Procedures,
61 IowA L. REV. 659, 677-82 (1976) (discusses the use of the right to a speedy trial to defeat
detainer warrants, balancing the exhaustion requirement with the fear of providing too much
aid for prosecutors).
10. 419 F.2d 1369 (4th Cir. 1970). The petition in question was filed by a prisoner incarcerated in Illinois who was also the subject of criminal indictments in Virginia, where the
charges had long been pending.
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reasoned that "the peculiar nature of the right to a speedy trial requires an
exception to this rule." I"This reasoning was expressly adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in Chauncey v. Second JudicialDistrictCourt of Nevada,12 in which
the court held that the petitioner had exhausted his state remedies by
presenting a speedy trial claim in every level of the state's judicial system,
even though he had not yet been brought to trial. 13 A similar result was
reached by the Fifth Circuit in Beck v. United States, 14 where the exhaustion requirement was deemed to have been met since the petitioner had
presented his speedy trial claim by a writ of mandamus to both the state trial
16
court and the state's highest court. 15 The state of the law following these
11. Id. at 1372. The court felt the nature of the right to a speedy trial to be peculiar because
"denial of a speedy trial adversely affects both the prisoner's present circumstances and his
ability to defend himself in the future" and stated that "only a present remedy can lift its dual
oppressions." Id.
To provide future guidance to the district courts, the court concluded its opinion by stating
that the state charges against a habeas corpus petitioner should be dismissed when it is proved:
I. that the prisoner demanded a speedy trial,
2. that the state nevertheless failed to make a diligent effort to obtain him for
trial, and
3. that he has exhausted his state remedies . . . by seeking dismissal of the
charges against him because of unconstitutional delay.
Id. at 1373.
12. 453 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971). The petitioner, by'state habeas corpus procedures, had
sought to bar prosecution by Nevada authorities on the grounds that he had been denied his
right to a speedy trial. The Nevada charges had been pending against the petitioner while he was
incarcerated for several years in an Arizona prison. Id. at 390.
13. 453 F.2d at 390 n. I. According to the court, requiring the petitioner to delay federal
review until after his trial would have been "an exercise in futility . . . especially when the
Id.
nature of the claimed right is examined ......
14. 442 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1971). The petitioner in this case was incarcerated in a federal
prison located in Texas when charges were filed against him by Texas authorities. After a
detainer warrant was served upon him, the petitioner filed a writ of mandamus with the state
trial court, requesting dismissal of the charges on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had
been violated. After a denial of his request by both the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Texas, the petitioner requested habeas relief from the federal courts.
15. Id. at 1038. The court held simply that "the [petitioner] has exhausted the state
remedies available to him," and reversed the district court, which had denied the petition for
failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id.
16. In addition to these courts, it is possible that the Third Circuit also favored federal
habeas review of a pretrial speedy trial claim. In United States ex rel. Jennings v. Pennsylvania,
429 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1970), in an opinion written by Judge Seitz, a district court's denial of a
pretrial habeas petition on exhaustion grounds was vacated with instructions to review the
petitioner's speedy trial claim and grant relief if warranted. This decision, however, may not
have been based on the "peculiar nature" of the right to a speedy trial, as were those of the
other circuits, but could possibly have been an angry reaction to a "sorry narrative of official
inaction or indifference." Id. at 523. Petitioner had made innumerable efforts over several
years to have the prosecutor, who did not even appear at the habeas hearing, bring him to trial.
According to Judge Seitz, "the facts here alleged concerning the deprivation of the right to a
speedy trial, if true, call out for something more [than denial of federal review] from a
concerned judiciary." Id.
One circuit may have taken a position opposite to that reflected in the decisions discussed
in the text. In Trigg v. Moseley, 433 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit denied review
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and related district court decisions 17 could be stated as follows: the exhaustion requirement of federal habeas corpus is satisfied by a state petitioner
when he has presented his claim of denial of a speedy trial to all levels of the
state judicial system, notwithstanding the fact that he has not yet been tried
and convicted by a state court.
It was at this point in the relaxation of the exhaustion requirement that
the Supreme Court decided Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky,' I
dicta from which persuaded several of the lower courts to restrict substantially the circumstances under which a pretrial habeas petitioner could obtain
review of his speedy trial claim. 19 Although the Court had granted certiorari
in order to resolve jurisdictional problems created by a ruling many years
earlier, 20 the issue as to whether the petitioner had exhausted his state
21
remedies had first to be considered and resolved in the petitioner's favor.
The fact that the petitioner was requesting that the state of Kentucky be
ordered to bring him to trial, and not that the charges be dismissed, was seen
by the Court as crucial in establishing that state remedies had been exhausted:
The fundamental interests underlying the exhaustion requirement have
been fully satisfied in petitioner's situation. He has already presented
his federal constitutional claim of a present denial of speedy trial to the
courts of Kentucky. Moreover, petitioner made no effort to abort a
state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial
processes. He comes to federal court not in an effort to forestall a state
of a pretrial habeas petition, stating that "the practicalities of judicial administration and the
doctrine of comity. . . require that these issues [concerning the denial of the right to a speedy
trial] be determined in the first instance by the state court where the charges are pending and the
pertinent witnesses readily available." Id. at 366. This decision, however, may not have been in
conflict with the other circuits, as the petitioner's claim had not been presented to all levels of
the state's judicial system. Id.
17. See, e.g., Evans v. Missouri, 325 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Garrett v. Womble,
299 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.C. 1969); United States ex rel. Epps v. Nenna, 274 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); contra, Smith v. Londerholm, 304 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1969).
18. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). In 1973 the petitioner was incarcerated in an Alabama state prison
with criminal charges against him pending in Kentucky. For several years after his indictment
on the Kentucky charges, he had without success made repeated demands that Kentucky bring
him to trial.
19. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text.
20. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). Ahrens held that a district court could not
hear a habeas corpus petition filed by a prisoner outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. The
effect of the decision was to deny habeas jurisdiction to many petitioners incarcerated in
another state. See Recent Decisions, FederalJurisdiction-HabeasCorpus, 40 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 475, 477-79 (1973).

21. The petitioner faced not only the obstacle presented by the Ahrens rule but also the
contention by Kentucky that state remedies would not be exhausted until the petitioner had
been convicted in state court. 410 U.S. at 487. Before reaching the Ahrens issue, the Court had
to hold that a habeas corpus petitioner could request a federal court to command a state to bring
him to trial. The petitioner in Braden made only this request, and did not petition for dismissal
of the charges against him. Id. at 490.
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[Kentucky's] obligations to provide him
prosecution, but to enforce
22
with a state court forum.
To underscore the limited nature of its holding, the Court emphasized
that "nothing we have said would permit the derailment of a pending state
proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in
federal court.' '23 This assurance, however, did not satisfy three dissenting
Justices, 24 who declared that the majority opinion was "a conversion of
federal habeas corpus into a pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.' '25
Contrary to the dissenters' suggestion, however, the Braden decision has
played a major role in limiting the circumstances under which a petitioner
claiming denial of a speedy trial can be deemed to have exhausted his state
remedies before trial.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE

Younger DOCTRINE

The first court of appeals after Braden to face a pretrial habeas petition
alleging denial of a speedy trial was the Third Circuit in Moore v.
DeYoung. 26 The court first stated that the petitioner's claim had not been
22. Id. at 492.
23. Id. at 494. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of how this
dictum was interpreted by the lower courts in their review of habeas petitions requesting a
dismissal of pending state charges.
24. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell dissented in an opinion written
by Justice Rehnquist.
25. 410 U.S. at 507 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). The dissent maintained that the petitioner in
substance was seeking to force the state to litigate a question that otherwise could only be
raised as an absolute defense in a state criminal proceeding against him. Id. at 503. This concern
was also shared by some commentators. See, e.g., Comment, CriminalProcedure-Habeas
Corpus-FederalJurisdictionExpanded, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 236, 241 (1973).
The dissenters' concern that federal habeas review had extended too far into the pretrial
stage of state proceedings was not precipitated by the Braden holding alone. Several recent
Supreme Court decisions, as well as cases from the courts of appeals, had held many forms of
pretrial judicial control over defendants to constitute "custody," making such defendants
eligible to file petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2254 (1970), the federal habeas statutes. By
the time Braden was decided, the following decisions had held restraints on liberty commonly
used by state courts at the pretrial stage to constitute "custody": Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968) (future sentence); Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (unconditional release after
petition filed); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole); United States ex rel.
Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1970) (parole detainer warrant); Marden v.
Purdy, 409 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1969) (free on bond); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1968)
(free on bail); United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912.(1967)
(probation).
It should also be noted that in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973), decided
shortly after Braden, the Court held release on one's own recognizance to constitute "custody" under the habeas corpus statutes.
26. 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975). The petitioner alleged that, although indicted in 1967 by a
New Jersey grand jury, he had not been brought to trial as of 1973. The petitioner had been
incarcerated during this time in a Virginia prison, and all motions made on his behalf for
dismissal of the charges had been denied. The petitioner's request for federal habeas relief was
granted by the district court, and all state criminal proceedings were ordered to be stayed
permanently. Id. at 441.
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presented to all levels of the state's judicial system, because the state
appellate courts had only denied interlocutory review of his speedy trial

claim without considering the claim on its merits. 27 Concluding that there
had been no exhaustion of state remedies, the court next considered whether
any "extraordinary circumstances" required federal review prior to ex-

haustion. 28 The court found none, perceiving "nothing in the nature of the
speedy trial right to qualify it as a per se 'extraordinary circumstance,' "29
notwithstanding the Kane and Chauncey decisions, 30 and citing Braden as
27. This ruling by the court appears highly questionable. In a decision rendered soon after
the codification of the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), the Supreme Court
stated that it "did not believe Congress intended to require repetitious application to state
courts." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1953). In a later case, Fransisco v. Gaithright,
419 U.S. 59 (1974), the Court confronted a situation similar to that in Moore, where the state
appellate courts had denied review of a habeas petitioner's claim without considering the issue
on the merits. The Court stated that:
[The state courts] had a full opportunity to determine the federal constitution issues
before resort was made to a federal forum, and the policies served by the exhaustion
requirement would not be furthered by requiring resubmission of the claims to the
state courts.
Id. at 63.
Some support for the position taken by the Moore court may be found, however, in Tooten
v. Shevin, 493 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the Fifth Circuit held that a petition requesting
review through a Writ of Prohibition, where the appellate court could change its position after
trial of the petitioner, was not an adequate attempt to obtain state vindication of constitutional
rights. Id. at 177. But see Eaton v. Wyrick, 528 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1975) (not necessary for
state courts to have ruled conclusively on the merits; rather, sufficient for exhaustion if state
court was properly presented with the opportunity to rule); Cage v. Auger, 514 F.2d 1231, 1232
(8th Cir. 1975) (federal court may entertain proceedings where it is clear that the state court has
had its opportunity to correct constitutional error); United States ex reL Geisler v. Walters, 510
F.2d 887, 892 (3d Cir. 1975) (the exhaustion requirement does not require that the state courts
have actually ruled on the merits, but merely that they have had these contentions presented to
them).
28. The exhaustion requirement is not an inflexible or absolute rule. As early as Reid v.
Jones, 187 U.S. 153 (1902), the Supreme Court recognized that a federal court could intervene
by writ of habeas corpus in advance of the final action by the state's highest court, in "certain
exceptional cases." Id. at 154. In a more recent case, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952),
the Court emphasized that the "general rule [requiring exhaustion] is not rigid and inflexible;
district courts may deviate from it and grant relief in special circumstances." Id. at 520-21.
The "exceptional circumstances" that relax the requirement of exhaustion are, by definition, rare. One example is the situation that existed in Frisbie, in which a man living in Chicago
was forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked, and taken to Michigan for trial. Id. at 520. The
"exceptional circumstance" cited by the Court was the frequency with which such actions
were gaining approval from district courts, thus necessitating expeditious review by the Supreme Court. See also United States ex rel. Richardson v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1972)
(district court took jurisdiction over the constitutionality of the petitioner's confinement and
interrupted service of his sentence).
29. 515 F.2d at 446. The cases cited in the previous footnote seem to support the position of
the Moore court in that "exceptional circumstances" in this context refer to the particular facts
of each case with no particular type of claim constituting a per se "extraordinary circumstance." See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521-22 (1952). A strong argument can be made for
a per se rule, however, based on the language in Kane and Chauncey referring to the "peculiar
nature" of the right to a speedy trial. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
30. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
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"specifically caution[ing] that its holding should not be construed as authorizing pretrial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes."" 1 The court could not terminate its
review of the petition at that point, however, since the district court had not
only ordered release of the petitioner, but had also issued an injunction
staying any state criminal proceedings.3 2 The issuance of the injunction
necessitated a consideration of Younger v. Harris.3 3 The court concluded
that Younger precluded pretrial injunction of state criminal proceedings,
even in the context of a speedy trial claim, and noted the close relationship
34
between the exhaustion requirement and the Younger doctrine.
31. 515 F.2d at 445-46. The court emphasized that the petitioner was not seeking to enforce
the state's duty to provide him with a trial, as in Braden. On the contrary, the request by the
petitioner was considered to be the very attempt to abort a state trial that the dicta in Braden
suggested must not be aided by federal courts. Id. at 446.
32. 515 F.2d at 447.
33. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This decision is the modern cornerstone of the doctrine restraining
federal intervention in state judicial proceedings. The case arose when a petitioner, indicted for
violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, sought a federal injunction against his
prosecution on the ground that such prosecution inhibited the exercise of his rights of free
speech and press.
In holding that an injunction should not issue, the Court gave as justification the longstanding public policy against federal injunction of state criminal proceedings in the absence of
irreparable injury both great and immediate. Id. at 46. See text accompanying notes 48-57 infra
for a discussion of the standards to be met before federal intervention is justified.
For an exhaustive discussion of the Younger decisions and their rationale, see Comment,
Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of EquitableRestraint:A CriticalAnalysis, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 523.
34. According to the court:
Although the doctrines of "habeas corpus-exhaustion" and "Younger-abstention"
are not directly related, they share many characteristics in common. They are both
predicated upon interests of federalism and comity; they both recognize exceptions
for "extraordinary circumstances"; both doctrines are doctrines of judicial restraint;
they both envisage adequate state remedies; and they both bar petitioners who seek
to abort state prosecutions, prior to trial or final state review.
515 F.2d at 448.
This comparison apparently has convinced at least one district court to rely directly on
Younger in the habeas corpus context. Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Pa. 1975);
Lovell v. Arnold, 381 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Pa. 1975). This court seems to have tied Younger
directly to habeas corpus. The Moore holding was summarized in the Clark opinion as follows:
[A] federal court may not interfere in an ongoing state criminal prosecution in the
pretrial habeas corpus context absent a showing of prosecutional bad faith or harassment or other "extraordinary circumstances" which call for the interposition of a
court of equity to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable injury which is clear and
imminent and for which there is no adequate remedy at law ....
394 F. Supp. at 1174.
It is ironic that Moore may have created this confusion and stimulated the use of Younger
in the habeas context to deny review of a speedy trial claim. The irony results from Grant v.
Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1974), which involved a petitioner who demanded dismissal of
charges on speedy trial grounds without having attempted to gain state appellate review of his
claim. Although the Third Circuit felt constrained to deny the petition on exhaustion grounds, it
emphasized that:
If. . .the Petitioner had demanded a speedy trial of the. . .[state] courts ... had
moved to dismiss the charges for lack of speedy prosecution, and had sought and
obtained appellate review of the denial of his motion to dismiss, habeas corpus relief
might be available ....
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A similar analysis was used by the Second Circuit in United States ex
rel. Scranton v. New York35 to dismiss a pretrial habeas petition alleging
denial of a speedy trial. Once again the Braden dicta was invoked to refute

the petitioner's assertion that the holding in Braden supported his claimed
exhaustion of all state remedies. 36 The relief requested by the petitioner, the
court held, was completely foreclosed by the principles enunciated in
37
Younger.
As will be explained below, it would appear that the reliance on

Younger in this situation is misplaced, for the following reasons: (1) the
general doctrinal framework of which Younger is a part is one significantly
different from that of habeas corpus; (2) the basic function intended for
Younger may have been to allow the Court to retreat from a prior decision
greatly expanding the role of federal courts in the state judicial process,
Id. at 1224.
Although this language is of course dictum, it indicates that the Third Circuit may be the
only circuit after Braden and Younger to acknowledge the power of a federal court to review a
pretrial petition alleging denial of a speedy trial. The principles of Younger played no part in
this earlier Third Circuit decision.
It is worth noting that the concurring judge in Moore, Judge Seitz, thought it unnecessary
to consider the question of exhaustion and the effect of Younger, noting only that:
The emphasis by the Supreme Court in Braden .

. .,

on the fact that the petitioner

there did not seek to abort a state proceeding compels me to conclude that where, as
here, a "derailment of a pending state proceeding" is sought, intervention by a
federal court cannot be permitted.
515 F.2d at 449.
35. 532 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1976). The petitioner in this case, who had been indicted on a
charge of murder in 1970, still had not been tried by a state court by 1975. The state had
attempted to begin trial once during this period, but a mistrial had been declared. Dismissal of
all charges was requested by the habeas petition filed in federal district court. Id. at 294-95.
36. While two of the courts of appeals addressing this question after Braden have used the
dicta from that decision in this way, most of the district courts have inferred a mandate from the
Supreme Court that a pretrial speedy trial claim is an affirmative defense which must first be
raised at state trial. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 402 F. Supp. 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1976); Prock v. Dist. Court of Okla. County, 391
F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Okla. 1975); MacDonald v. Faulkner, 378 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
The only district courts holding otherwise have been courts within the Fourth Circuit
where the Kane decision has never been overruled or modified. See Crump v. Bedford County
Circuit Court, 360 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Va. 1973); Norris v. Georgia, 357 F. Supp. 1200
(W.D.N.C. 1973), modified, 522 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975). In its review of the Norris decision
the Fourth Circuit discussed Braden in terms of its effect on jurisdiction and venue, but made
no mention of its application to the exhaustion requirement.
37. 532 F.2d at 295. To support its position, the court quoted the following passage from
Younger:
In all of these cases the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury,
the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court
also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference
with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost,
"both great and immediate ......
anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution,
could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in the special legal sense of that
term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected right must be one that
cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
Id. at 295-96 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
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while at the same time retaining some flexibility; and (3) a state which has
denied a prisoner his right to a speedy trial is not entitled to the deference
Younger extends in the name of federal-state comity.
As has been pointed out in recent decisions, Younger involved a suit
for a federal injunction against state proceedings, not a petition requesting
habeas corpus relief. 38 The importance of this distinction is that it establishes the general context in which Younger was decided and bears on the
justification for the holding. It should be noted that the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against state proceedings is forbidden by statute,
except in very limited circumstances. 39 Any reluctance by federal courts to
issue an injunction against a state criminal prosecution therefore results not
only from a high regard for federal-state comity, but also from the prohibition imposed by statutory law. 4 The contrast with habeas corpus proceedings is apparent, for habeas is a form of relief guaranteed by the Constitution, 4 1 provided for expressly by statute, 42 and historically construed
43
broadly by the courts.
38. The dissenting judge in Chauncey v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 453 F.2d 389
(9th Cir. 1971), see notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text, contended that the Younger
holding disapproved the interference with the state sanctioned by the majority. The majority,
however, replied that the case before them was not a suit for an injunction or declaratory
judgment, but a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970). Id. at 390 n.1.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), often referred to as the Anti-Injunction Statute, reads as
follows: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." It would appear that the statute's
prohibitions are absolute but for its express exceptions, and that its provisions rest upon the
power of Congress and not notions of comity. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 396 U.S. 1201 (1970); Comment, Federal Courts-FederalAnti-Injunction
Statute-Injunctionsin FederalCourts to Stay Proceedingsin State CourtsMust Be Within One
of the Statutory Exceptions to the FederalAnti-Injunction Statute, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 616
(1971).
40. The Anti-Injunction Statute may be seen as a statutory embodiment of traditional
judicial concern for the principles of comity and federalism, and an effort to maintain the
delicate balance between those principles and individual constitutional interests. See Comment,
Exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute: The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Bad Faith
Enforcement of Unconstitutional State Statutes Where a State Proceeding Is Pending, 21
AMERICAN U.L. REV. 395,396 (1972). It was also stressed by a member of the Younger majority
that intervention by a federal court when the Younger requirements are met is still subject to
any further limitations that may be placed on such intervention by the Anti-Injunction Statute.
401 U.S. at 56 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)
(requirements of Younger must be fulfilled even though action brought falls under one of the
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute).
41. The writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended, "unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public safety may require it." U.S.CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See also C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (3d ed. 1976), where the author suggests that the broad reach of
habeas corpus may even be beyond the power of Congress to limit.
42. Habeas corpus relief is the subject of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), governing pretrial relief,
and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which applies to post-conviction remedies. See note I supra for a
discussion of these statutes and their relation to the exhaustion requirement.
43. The great breadth of the federal courts' power of independent adjudication of habeas
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The statutory limitations on the power of federal courts to issue injunctions, together with one particular attempt by the Supreme Court to avoid
these limitations, also explain the basic need for the Younger decision, and
suggest the purpose behind the principles articulated in that decision.
While Congress had provided certain statutory exceptions to the Anti-

Injunction Statute, there were few other ways to avoid the statute's application until the Court decided Dombrowski v. Pfister." That case held that the
Anti-Injunction Statute did not apply in situations where no state prosecutions were pending, and that a federal court could strike down state statutes
unconstitutional on their face. 45 This left open the question of whether

federal injunctions could issue to forbid prosecution under an unconstitutional state statute when state proceedings had already been instituted.46 To
stem the ensuing flood of pleas for intervention by federal courts47 the Court
was forced to limit in some way the relief authorized by Dombrowski. The

Court did this not by use of the Anti-Injunction Statute, but by resort to the
traditional prerequisites for equitable relief from the judicial system. The
use of these prerequisites-the threat of irreparable injury and the lack of an

adequate remedy at law-was said by the Court to be justified also by
notions of federal-state comity. 4s The courts in Moore and Scranton applied
corpus stems from the very nature and history of the writ. See generally Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963).
Although the recent decision of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed in notes 7779 infra, excluded fourth amendment claims from the scope of habeas corpus review, that
ruling would appear to be based on the nature and purpose of the exclusionary rule, and may
not indicate an end to broad construction of habeas jurisdiction.
44. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendant was an organization active in fostering civil rights
for blacks in Louisiana. It brought suit to request an injunction against the operation of the
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Propaganda Control Law, on the ground that
the statute by its terms violated the first amendment. The three-judge district court dismissed
the complaint, holding that there had been no presentation of threatened irreparable injury to
federal rights which warranted cutting short the normal adjudication of constitutional defenses
in state criminal proceedings.
45. Id. at 484 n.2, 491-92. Although the majority opinion did not state specifically that the
Anti-Injunction Statute was inapplicable in all such situations, it would appear that this case
presented a situation where the Statute did not apply, and was not a case where a judicial
exception was engrafted upon the Statute. See Reaves, The FederalAnti-Injunction Statute in
the Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. REv. 294 (1971).
46. This question was of necessity left open since no criminal proceedings had yet been
instituted by Louisiana, although there was evidence of threats of suit by state officials. See generally
Shevin, FederalIntrusion in State Court Proceedings, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 3.
47. Although most Supreme Court decisions granting relief in a case involving federal
intervention in state criminal proceedings produce large increases in the number of related
petitions, the increase after Dombrowski was particularly significant. See Recent Cases,
Injunctions-FederalCourts May Not Enjoin State Criminal Proceedings Unless Irreparable
Injury is Shown From Harassmentin the Prosecutionof Patently UnconstitutionalStatutes, 40
U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 617-18 (1971).

48. 401 U.S. at 43-45. Three distinct requirements are suggested by the Court which must
be met by a plaintiff before he may successfully seek a federal injunction of state criminal
proceedings. First, he must meet the traditional equitable standards, that is, irreparable harm is
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these principles in considering the harm suffered by a state defendant during
the defense of a criminal prosecution, 49 and use them to support their

dismissal of pretrial habeas petitions containing speedy trial claims. 50 It
could therefore be argued that use of the equitable prerequisites in the
habeas corpus context is improper when one considers that the prerequisites
may have been used by the Younger Court, rather than the Anti-Injunction
Statute, in order to retain a large degree of discretion over the issuance of
injunctions. 51 The distinction between habeas and injunctive relief was thus
ignored by these courts.

It is also instructive to examine the interests and policies on which the
Younger opinion rested. According to the Court, the Younger holding was
based partly on the basic doctrine that courts of equity should not exercise
their extraordinary powers when the moving party has an adequate remedy
at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.5 2 One

of the policies protected by this doctrine, that of preventing any erosion of
the role of a jury, 53 has no relevance in the habeas context, as there is no role

whatsoever provided for a jury. 54 Another concern of this equitable doctrine, that of avoiding any duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions, 55 is not present in the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, since duplication
was obviously contemplated by Congress, whether federal review occurs
after conviction in the state court5 6 or before a state court has rendered
threatened and no adequate remedy at law exists to protect him. Second, his situation must fall
within one of the statutory exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute. Finally, he must demonstrate prosecutorial bad faith or harassment on the part of state officials or other extraordinary
circumstances. Id. All these requirements rest upon the fundamental policy against federal
intervention in state criminal proceedings, absent truly extraordinary circumstances. See C.
WRIGHT, note 41 supra, § 52 (3d ed. 1976); Comment, Federal Abstention-A Restrictive
Interpretationof the Dombrowski Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 652 (1971); Recent Developments,
Federal Courts-R,for FederalAnticipatory Relief in State CriminalProceedings, 51 WASH. L.
REV. 209, 215 (1975).
49. 401 U.S. at 46. The harm suffered by the defense of a single criminal prosecution is not
"irreparable harm" sufficient to justify federal equitable relief. See note 34 supra where the
complete passage of the opinion appears.
50. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1976);
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975).
51. See Gilbert, Questions Unanswered by the FebruarySextet, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 14, 18
(1972). The Court may also have wished to retain this discretion in order to be able to adjust the
relationship between the state and federal courts as its own composition shifts with fluctuations
in the political climate. See Whitten, FederalDeclaratoryandInjunctive Interference with State
Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. REV.
591 (1975), for an argument that this is a discretion which the Court is not entitled to exercise.
52. 401 U.S. at 43-45.
53. Id. at 44.
54. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is by definition a judicialorder directing a
government official to bring a person within his custody before the court, for an inquiry into
the legality of that custody. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-415 (1963).
55. 401 U.S. at 44.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which governs collateral attack on convictions finally
rendered.
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judgment. 57 In fact, it is the collateral-and inherently duplicative-nature
of habeas relief which makes it a powerful constitutional guarantee against
unlawful incarceration.
A stronger argument, however, for reliance on Younger is the substantial identity of the two doctrines' concern for the relationship between the
federal and state judiciaries. The holding in Younger was motivated most
significantly by considerations of "comity" and "Our Federalism." A
proper respect for state functions was required of the federal courts, based
on a recognition that "the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and . . . [that] the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways." 58 The judicial doctrine of exhaustion was
founded on a similar concern for the role that state courts were felt to play in
the vindication of federal rights. 59 These and other similarities between the
two doctrines have been emphasized by many courts, 6 0 and recent Supreme
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970), which provides for habeas corpus relief in the absence of
any final action by a state court.
58. 401 U.S. at 44. Although the Court in Younger "merged" the two concepts, "comity"
and "Our Federalism" had traditionally been considered and applied separately. "Comity"
was defined as the duty of respect owed by federal courts to state courts, arising from the
principle that state courts share with federal courts the solemn responsibility of guaranteeing
constitutional rights. "Our Federalism," however, was considered to be a broader concept,
requiring federal courts to protect federal rights in a manner that would not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the states. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 151 n.2 (1975); Comment, note 33 supra, at 530 n.28. There is perhaps little lost in the
merging of the two concepts, in that comity appears merely to be the duty of respect arising
from recognition of "Our Federalism."
59. See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898), and Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886). See also note I supra.
60. In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), the Supreme Court discussed the
two doctrines in dismissing a suit by a serviceman to enjoin his court martial proceedings.
According to the Court:
[C]onsiderations of comity [and] the necessity of respect for coordinate judicial
systems . . . have led this Court to preclude equitable intervention [unless Younger
requirements are met] .

. .

. Precisely these considerations underlie the requirement

that petitioners seeking habeas relief from state criminal convictions must first
exhaust available state remedies.
Id. at 756.
See also Dolack v. Allenbrand, 548 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1977) (both doctrines based on comity-Younger applied jn habeas context, distinctions between the two
not of great significance); Tatzel v. Hanlon, 530 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1976) (the same policy
considerations underlie both doctrines); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975)
(language cited in note 34 supra); Theriault v. Lamb, 377 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Nev. 1974).
The very close relationship between the two doctrines is also made clear by another recent
decision, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In that case, the Court not only
extended the application of Younger to injunction against state civil proceedings, but held that
the Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention where the losing litigant has
not exhausted his state appellate remedies. Id. at 607-09. This holding, although illustrating the
Court's strong bias against federal intervention in yet another setting, would not seem to affect
directly the resolution of a speedy trial claim in a habeas case, since the cases under discussion
in this Note involve petitioners who have exhausted their state appellate remedies.
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Court decisions have greatly expanded the areas to which Younger applies,
affirming that doctrine's continued vitality.61 But regardless of the strength
of this argument in favor of Younger's application to the habeas context in
general, there are several considerations which militate strongly against 62the
use of Younger to deny pretrial habeas review of a speedy trial claim.
First, the principle of comity relied on by Younger insures that federal
courts will not, by their interference with state courts, convey a mistrust of
the state courts' ability to resolve constitutional claims. 63 There is, however,
certainly a question as to whether a state court or its criminal justice system
deserves any deference when it has not complied with the constitution's
mandate to grant the defendant a prompt hearing. In much the same way, the
concept of "Our Federalism" promotes a significant state interest by discouraging the federal courts from unduly disrupting the smooth functioning
of the state's judicial system. Again, however, an argument that a state's
judiciary is functioning smoothly is a hard one to make in the face of a
petitioner's long incarceration without trial. 64
61. This continued vitality of the Younger doctrine, especially as viewed through Schlesinger, was specifically relied on by the Second Circuit in Scranton. See 532 F.2d at 296.
62. Most courts that have applied Younger to deny review of a speedy trial claim have done
so by citing the portion of that opinion which states that "the threat to the plaintiff's federally
protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal
prosecution" for there to be "irreparable injury." 401 U.S. at 46. See United States ex rel.
Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292 (1976), and text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. The
concept that the "irreparable injury" requirement is not satisfied simply because the accused
must defend a criminal prosecution actually dates from cases well before Younger. See Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).

63. The fact that this concern exists is one reason that federal intervention in a state
proceeding is considered so disruptive of good working relationships between the federal and
state judicial systems. By intervening, the federal court is implying that the state court is not
sufficiently competent to comprehend and apply federal constitutional law. See Recent Developments, The Availability of Federal Relief When No State Prosecution Is Pending, 19 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 419, 426 (1975).
64. Indeed, it can also be argued that the Younger doctrine itself contains exceptions which
answer directly the concern that there exists an adequate and effective state forum.
One situation in which Younger will not compel a dismissal is one in which there is present
any "bad faith" or "harassment" by the state. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48 (1971).
Later decisions indicate that federal courts may find such a situation to exist where there is an
invocation of the criminal process without any hope of ultimate success. See Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802 (1974). Another situation which will lead to avoidance of a Younger dismissal is
the presence of "extraordinary circumstances," such as a statute "flagrantly and patently"
unconstitutional, for which there exists no possibility of constitutional application. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill.
1975), prob. juris, noted, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976) (unconstitutional Attachment Act); Nihiser v.
Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Il1. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 976 (1975) (statute allowing
confiscation of materials without judicial determination of obscenity).
In summary, the presumption that state officials will adequately protect federal constitutional rights exists only where prosecution is undertaken in good faith without harassment, and
in the absence of any other extraordinary circumstances. A failure by the state to so act
indicates that only federal intervention remains to vindicate a defendant's constitutional rights.
See Casey, FederalCourt Intervention in State CriminalProsecutions,56 MASS. L.Q. 11 (1971);
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It should also be pointed out that the application of Younger in this
context is contrary to the rationale for a traditional exception to the habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement. In appropriate cases, inordinate delay in a
state's judicial process may preclude a state from relying on the exhaustion
requirement to defeat federal review, on the premise that the state has by its
delay rendered any possible remedy ineffective to protect the petitioner's
67
66
65
rights, whether the delay occurs before or after final conviction.

A strong argument can thus be made that Younger and its progeny
should not be applied to bar an injunction against further state criminal
prosecution of a defendant who has been denied his right to a speedy trial.
The most recent solution to this habeas corpus problem, however, does not
address the issue.
THE BRADEN DICTA: JUDICIAL COMPROMISE OR
REMEDY TO FIT THE VIOLATION?

The most recent application of the exhaustion requirement to a habeas
petition alleging denial of a speedy trial was Brown v. Estelle,68 decided by
Note, DeclaratoryJudgments: FederalAnticipatory Relief from State Criminal Statutes After
Steffel v. Thompson, 50 IND. L.J. 567, 577 (1975).
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the Younger doctrine's requirement of an adequate and
effective state forum as a prerequisite to its application is found in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564 (1973), when the Court upheld the injunction of a State Board of Optometry hearing:
Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the
presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts. Such a course
naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
65. See Rheuark v. Wade, 540 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1976); Cottman v. Donnelly, 398 F.
Supp. 1086, 1090 (D. Mass. 1975).
66. See, e.g., Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976); Reynolds v.
Wainwright, 460 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1972). This exception to the exhaustion requirement
appears to be one particular application of the general principle that where there are any
circumstances which render a state's corrective process ineffective to protect a prisoner's
rights or which indicate that further pursuit of a remedy would be an exercise in futility, habeas
corpus relief may be granted. See, e.g., Cage v. Auger, 514 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8th Cir. 1975);
Terry v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 694, 695 (6th Cir. 1972); Franks v. Johnson, 401 F. Supp. 669, 670
(E.D. Mich. 1975).
67. This points out yet another similarity, albeit an unfortunate one, between the Younger
doctrine and the exhaustion requirement: when a state court does not allow an individual to
present his claims, or provides a forum that does not render its decision on his claims with
reasonable dispatch, any invocation of Younger or the exhaustion requirement serves only to
shield an invasion of the petitioner's rights. See generally Palmer v. Judge and District Attorney of the 13th Judicial Dist. of Tenn., 411 F. Supp. 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). This opinion is
either a very courageous or a remarkably uninformed decision, for it granted a pretrial petition
containing a speedy trial claim with no reference either to the warnings in Braden or the
principles of Younger. When confronted by the state's contentions that the federal court should
refrain from acting since the petitioner could present his speedy trial claim at his trial, the court
stated: "The fact that the state may finally be ready to move when the federal court raises its
hand is no cure for the infection and potentially irreparable injury wreaked by the delay." Id. at
1034 (quoting United States ex rel. Hill v. Deagan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
68. 530 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976). The petitioner was incarcerated in a Texas state prison at
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the Fifth Circuit. The issue considered by the court was stated simply as
"whether petitioner has any right to invoke federal habeas corpus in view of
69 In holding
the fact that he has not yet been tried on the indictment . . "..that the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies, the court denied
relief on the basis of the distinction made by Braden between a petitioner
who seeks to abort a state proceeding and one who seeks only to enforce the
state's obligation to bring him promptly to trial. 70 According to the court,
the distinction should be made on the basis of the type of relief sought: an
attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise to prevent a prosecution is an
effort to abort a state proceeding, while an attempt to force the state to go to
trial is an attempt to enforce a valid obligation of the state. 7 1 To justify its
holding that dismissal of the charges is an objective not obtainable through
federal habeas corpus, the court stated that:
[A] claim that indictments should be dismissed because of an already
accomplished violation of a speedy trial right amounts to an attempt to
assert an affirmative defense to a state72 criminal charge prior to a
judgment of conviction by a state court.
The court based its holding strictly on the guidance provided by
Braden, with no attempt to rely on the Younger principles of federalism
and comity. The court's analysis separated violations of the right to a speedy
trial into two categories: a present denial of the right, which a federal court
may remedy by commanding the state to bring a prisoner to trial, and a past
or completed denial of the right, which is an affirmative defense that must
be litigated at trial before consideration by the federal courts.
the time he filed for habeas relief. While serving a sentence for armed robbery, the petitioner
learned of the existence of two assault-related charges against him outstanding in a Texas
county. After various attempts over a period of two years to have these charges brought to trial,

the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial claim. After this motion was
denied by the trial court and all Texas appellate courts, the petitioner requested federal habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).

Particular attention should be paid to the analysis used by this court as it is the only circuit
which has changed its position on the speedy trial issue since the Braden decision. See notes 14-

15 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's previous position,
articulated in Beck v. United States, 442 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1971).
69. 530 F.2d at 1282. The petition filed with the district court definitely requested a

dismissal of the charges pending in state court but was also deemed by the court to request that,
in the alternative, the state should be forced to begin trial. Due to this construction of the
petition, the court ruled that the petition would be subject to review as a claim of present denial
of a speedy trial, provided the petitioner followed certain detailed state procedures. Id. at 1283.

See text accompanying notes 73-85 infra for a discussion of the distinction between claiming a
present denial and a past denial.

70. Id. at 1283-84. The distinction discussed by the Brown court may be found in Braden v.
30th Judicial Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,491-93 (1973). See notes 73-85 infra and accompanying

text.
71.

Id. at 1283. See Tooten v. Shevin, 493 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421

U.S. 966 (1975), where this argument is applied to a petitioner requesting habeas relief from
prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional state statute.
72. 530 F.2d at 1283 (emphasis added).
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This subdivision of the right to a speedy trial can be seen as the result of
a judicial compromise. One alternative would have been to hold that the
exhaustion requirement could be met only after all affirmative defenses,
including a speedy trial claim, had been presented at state trial and a
conviction returned.73 This alternative clearly would have been unacceptable, however, since the constitutional right to a speedy trial could be
defeated by a state court's refusal ever to bring a prisoner to trial. 74
The other alternative would have been to allow review of a speedy trial
claim after such claim had been presented by motion at all levels of the state
judicial system, whether or not the petitioner was requesting dismissal of the
charges or simply demanding a trial. This view represented the state of the
law prior to Braden, but proved unacceptable to the court in that decision. 75
An examination of several other recent decisions 76 indicates the reason
this alternative has been rejected: the scope of habeas corpus, characterized
as a "serious intrusion on values important to our system of government,', 77
has undergone a general constriction. 78 It has been suggested that this
73. This alternative may have been suggested to some extent by the Ninth Circuit in Drury
v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court implied that Younger compels state
finality on all issues presented by a case before a habeas petition may be considered. See note
38 supra for an argument that this implication was not intended by the court.
74. Obviously, if federal habeas review cannot take place until after trial of the prisoner,
the state could thwart any federal review simply by not bringing the prisoner to trial. Of course,
the petitioner would argue in such a case that the exhaustion requirement should be waived
because of "extraordinary circumstances," see note 28 supra, or the lack of an effective state
forum, see note 66 supra.
75. See notes 10-18 supra and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment claim not required to
be heard by federal court in habeas review if state has provided full and fair adjudication of
claim); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (unintended failure to comply with state
procedural waiver rule bars federal review of the issue); Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973) (exhaustion required in civil rights action by state prisoner); Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. I
(1972) (burden on petitioner to disprove state court factual determinations); Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270 (1971) (no exhaustion if state courts have not had first opportunity to hear claim);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (guilty plea a waiver of any pretrial deficit).
77. Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
78. This development is best understood in terms of the political climate surrounding the
Court and the resulting decisions affecting the scope of federal review of state criminal
prosecutions. During the 1960's, the expansion of rights for criminal defendants and the
extension of these rights to state defendants stimulated political concern for "law and order,"
and eventually led to the appointment of several Justices who were described as "strict
constructionists." See Miller & Shepard, New Looks at an Ancient Writ: Habeas Corpus
Reexamined, 9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 49, 68-69 (1974), for a discussion of the effects of these
cries for "law and order" upon federal intervention in state proceedings. The net result of this
political trend and series of appointments appears to have been a gradual withdrawal by the
federal courts from the enforcement of constitutional rights guaranteed to state defendants.
Indeed, "federal-state comity" and "principles of federalism" may serve as an excuse for
stripping federal courts of jurisdiction conferred by Congress in order to protect constitutional
rights. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 548-51 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see
Comment, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings:InadequateRemedies in Ade-
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constriction, in turn, is a result of a reluctance of the Court
to grant habeas
79
relief for "non-'guilt-related' constitutional violations."
The compromise by subdivision of the right appears to be one which
guarantees that a state prisoner will not remain imprisoned indefinitely
without a trial, yet one which also gives the state a last opportunity to fulfill
its constitutional responsibility before a federal court completely divests the
state of its control over the prisoner. This compromise, which has resulted
from the interplay between concern for basic enforcement of the speedy trial
right and a general decision to constrict the scope of federal review of state
decisions, is not itself immune from criticism. The courts now applying this
compromise are in reality granting a form of relief which has traditionally
been considered to be inadequate for the violation of the right to a speedy
trial. The absolute and complete discharge of a prisoner has been considered
the only effective remedy 0 because prosecutors, who were free to commence another prosecution after the speedy trial claim had been sustained,
would not be deterred from causing undue delay in the future.8" The remedy
now applied, that of requiring trial by the state within a reasonable time, had
been previously suggested as appropriate by Justice Harlan in his dissent in
Smith v. Hooey. 82 The majority of the present Court, however, had recently
quate Forums, 63 GEO. L.J. 1143 (1975) (suggesting that the Court is properly reconciling the
state's legitimate interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws and the federal courts' role as
the primary guardian of federal constitutional rights).
79. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 516 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The reduction in
the scope of federal habeas corpus review may be based on this factor rather than concerns for
notions of federal-state comity. The cases cited in note 76 supra may be the groundwork for a
drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction for non-guilt related detention, although such
detention may be unconstitutional. See id. at 516-17 (1976) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
80. Most state statutes providing a detailed plan for the enforcement of a defendant's right
to a speedy trial dismiss all charges if that right has been violated and bar any subsequent
prosecution on those charges. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(h)(1); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §
210.20(1)(g)(4) (McKinney 1971). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (Supp. IV 1974), the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, which provides that if a prisoner is not tried according to the time limits set by the
Act, the court may dismiss with or without prejudice, depending on the seriousness of the
offense, the facts which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of justice. This statute, however, is not used as a standard for interpreting the
sixth amendment. See United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 204 n. 15 (4th Cir. 1976). See
notes 82-83 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional remedies
considered by the Court to be available.
81. Dismissal with prejudice would seem to be a necessary element of any scheme that
purports to place an affirmative duty on the state to comply with the requirements of the right to
a speedy trial. See Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369 (4th Cir. 1970), discussed at notes 10-11
supra and accompanying text; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY
TRIAL-APPROVED DRAFT 40 (1968); Poulos & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation:
The ABA Standardsin Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1976); Note, The Right to
a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 866 (1957); Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and
CriminalJustice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 794 (1972).
82. 393 U.S. 374, 384 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that a decision
holding that the right to a speedy trial had been violated should not result in the automatic
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stated that although the remedy of dismissal is a very serious and severe one,
83
"it is the only possible remedy."
While the above language would seem to prohibit the remedy applied
in Braden, a closer analysis indicates that such a remedy will quite adequately serve to protect the right to a speedy trial. According to the Court,
the guarantee of a speedy trial is an important safeguard which prevents
"undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial . . . and [limits] the
possibility that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself." 84 In a very real sense, the interest served by the guarantee of a
speedy trial may therefore be insured by two different remedies. The
"undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial" may be alleviated by
requiring the state to bring a habeas petitioner to trial, and the prejudice to
his defense may be cured after he has suffered a conviction (and the
prejudice to his defense has become apparent)8 5 by ordering a dismissal of
all charges.
CONCLUSION

Although federal courts initially demonstrated a willingness to review a
habeas corpus petition claiming denial of a speedy trial notwithstanding the
fact that the petitioner had not yet been convicted by any state court, that
position was substantially changed by the combined force of two significant
events. The Supreme Court's decision in Braden suggested that a habeas
petitioner requesting dismissal before trial had not exhausted his state
remedies, and the Younger doctrine of federal-state comity was expanded to
apply in many areas related to the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. Although
the reliance upon Younger to justify a holding that exhaustion had not
occurred may be misplaced, it is apparent that the change in this state of the
law can be justified by considering Braden to be an attempt to fashion a
remedy more responsive to the interests served by the right to a speedy trial.
dismissal of the charge. Instead, the Court should require the state to prosecute within a
reasonable time or forfeit that right. See also Yoo Kun Wha v. Sheriff of Fulton County, 436
F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1970) (adopting Justice Harlan's approach in Hooey).
83. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). The Court considered the remedy of
dismissal to be unsatisfactorily severe, since a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime
will go free, without ever having been tried. Id. The Court pointed out, however, in Strunk v.
United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) (unanimous decision), that the denial of the right is
unlike the denial of other rights, such as those guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments,
which can be cured by providing a new trial or excluding certain evidence. The Court reaffirmed in that case that "in light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial,
dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, the only possible remedy." 412 U.S. at 440.
84. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
85. Indeed, in determining whether there has been a violation of the right to a speedy trial,
the prejudice to the petitioner's defense is a factor to be considered, along with the length of
delay, the reason for the delay, and the defendant's assertion of his right. See generally Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976).

Vol. 1977:707]

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT

725

The remedy fashioned, requiring a state to bring a defendant to trial rather
than dismissing the charges, is the result of a compromise: the remedy to be
applied adequately safeguards the basic interests served by the right to a
speedy trial, yet is consistent with the Court's present reluctance to continue
federal interference with state adjudication of federal constitutional rights.

